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A Regulatory Model for Personal Data on Social Networking Services in the UK 
Abstract 
Widespread use of online social networking services (SNSs) exposes users to a variety of risks.  This 
study examines the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and considers the wider regulatory 
landscape in the UK.  Although based on EU legislation, the DPA has shortcomings in enforcement 
and in regulating global services using national legislation.  Lessig’s model of internet regulation was 
used as a starting point to examine the alternative regulatory mechanisms that apply to personal 
data on SNSs.  Interviews with industry experts highlighted self-regulation as a major influence on 
the behaviour of users and SNS providers.  This has been incorporated into a new model of 
regulation that applies to SNSs.  The resulting model has identified the following modes: law 
(statutory legislation), self-regulation (privacy policies and self-regulation of the online advertising 
industry), code (the way services are designed and their system architecture), and norms (expressed 
as user behaviour and collectively as market behaviour).  The paper concludes that this new model 
of regulation is needed to adequately describe the current regulatory landscape as it applies to 
social media.  This may form a better basis for evaluation of regulatory effectiveness in the future. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Increasing use of online social networking services (SNSs) has raised concerns about the ways in 
which personal data is exposed to general view and the risks that can result (Haynes & Robinson, 
2015).  SNSs are used in a variety of ways and contexts.  For instance, Facebook is a largely social and 
leisure network but increasingly is being used for campaigning and marketing.  LinkedIn is a largely 
professional network.  Twitter has many communities for live-streaming of events (from natural 
disasters, to conferences, parties and festivals) and news, and for some professional and academic 
material, as well as keeping up with friends and feeding on celebrity gossip.  A new generation of 
ephemeral services such as Whatsapp and Snapchat are used for instant messaging and status 
updates.  
These services are largely free of charge to users and the network providers gain revenue mostly 
from selling personal data profiles to advertisers.  Although this personal data is aggregated and to 
some extent anonymized, there are concerns about de-anonymization of data and about online 
behavioural advertising and its potential intrusiveness (Christiansen, 2011; De Lima & Legge, 2014; 
Litvínov, 2013; Scott, 2013).  There is also increasing concern about the risks that users face when 
their data is shared with third parties or used in unexpected ways (Denham, 2009).  Butler (2011) 
showed that periodic modifications to Facebook’s privacy policy meant that users did not know what 
settings applied to their profiles.  Two reports in the New York Times highlighted the risks associated 
with the introduction of new features that impact on privacy (Helft & Wortham, 2010; Story & 
Stone, 2007).  Web beacons provided third party sites with details of purchases by Facebook 
members, which were automatically posted on friends’ newsfeeds.  This led to an outcry about 
invasion of privacy and the setting change was reversed. 
Wider concerns raised by the regulatory authorities and campaigning groups have focused on 
dangers posed by exposing personal details on SNS profiles.  Cases of burglary, home invasion, 
threats and actual physical violence have all been attributed to abuse of personal data on SNSs (BBC 
News, 2013a; McDonald, 2013; Roberts, 2010).  There have been tragic cases of bullying that have 
led to self-harm or even suicide (Blake, 2015; Cox, 2014; The Moscow Times, 2015; Wakefield, 2014).  
Other commentators have also considered the risks to children of grooming, bullying and abuse via 
social media (Livingstone, 2013; Slavtcheva-Petkova, Nash, & Bulger, 2015; Staksrud & Livingstone, 
2009). 
One response to these risks is to regulate access to personal data.  For instance, in the United 
Kingdom (UK) the Data Protection Act 1998 (based on the European Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC) provides some remedy against these risks. 
Lessig (2006) devised a model of regulation of the internet which identifies: law, code, norms and 
market as regulatory modes.  This model was analysed by Cooke (2004) and is developed further in 
this paper to reflect the current regulatory landscape for SNSs in the UK.  Other commentators have 
considered the application of Lessig’s model in countries such as Singapore and Brazil, as well as the 
European Union (Jiow, 2013; Lynskey, 2012; Medeiros & Bygrave, 2015). 
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1.2 Objectives 
This paper sets out to map the nature of regulation of access to personal data on SNSs.  It is focused 
on the European regulatory framework as it applies in the UK and incorporates national, 
international and global responses to issues of privacy and protection of personal data. 
This paper develops a conceptual model to describe the regulatory modes that apply to protection 
of personal data on online SNSs.  One of the purposes of regulation is to reduce risk (Baldwin, Cave, 
& Lodge, 2012; Hutter, 2006).  The model focuses specifically on reduction of risk to users and looks 
at the nature of the risks that users face.  This can be characterized by the degree of personalization 
of the data and its sensitivity in terms of perceived or actual harm that arises from misuse.   
2 Methods 
An ‘interpretivist’ approach, as suggested by Weber and others is used to gain a fuller understanding 
of the different regulatory modes and their interaction with SNS use (Outhwaite & Turner, 2007; 
Weber, 1970).   
A literature review was conducted using EBSCOhost and the ISI Web of Knowledge and by tracking 
citations to identify scholarly works on regulation of the internet and specifically of SNSs.  
A model of regulation based on Lessig’s (2006) modes of regulation was developed to take into 
account the subsequent development of social media and SNSs in particular.  Face-to-face and 
telephone interviews were conducted with ten respondents representing industry and professional 
groups as well as regulators, academics and industry experts.  The industry groups represented the 
interests of advertisers and SNS providers.  The user perspective was represented by CILIP, and, to 
some extent, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).  Respondents were asked to identify 
what they thought were the key issues that needed to be addressed in regulating access to personal 
data and their views on existing approaches to regulation.  The interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and sent to the interviewees for checking and permission to quote.  They were analysed 
using NVivo10 to code responses and identify emergent themes.  See Appendix A for a list of the 
respondents and the questions asked during the semi-structured interviews.  Some of the questions 
were directed at specific groups.  The following topics were explored:  
 Attitudes to risk associated with social networks, usage of social media and view on 
effectiveness of different types of regulation of access to personal data 
 View of current regulatory measures, with a specific focus on legislation 
 View of regulators and what they perceive to be the challenges for future regulation of 
access to personal data 
3 Theory 
3.1 Definition of Regulation 
Baldwin, Cave and Lodge’s (2012, pp. 2–3) definition of regulation is significant in acknowledging 
that it goes beyond “control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a 
community”.  In one of their definitions Baldwin, Cave and Lodge state: 
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…that regulation may be carried out not merely by state institutions but by a host of 
other bodies, including corporations, self-regulators, professional or trade bodies, 
and voluntary organizations. [Regulation can be seen:] 
As a specific set of commands … 
As deliberate state influence … 
As all forms of social or economic influence … 
3.2 What is Being Regulated? 
Regulation can be viewed in terms of who is being regulated.  For instance, is it the industry, their 
agents, or the consumers that are being regulated?  The Data Protection Act 1998 focuses on the 
responsibilities of the data controller who can in some cases be seen as representing the SNS 
provider.  Part of the problem arises in the definition of data controller, whether it is the user who 
puts up a personal profile on an SNS or the service provider (Bond, 2010).  
It could also be argued that activities are being regulated rather than individuals and organisations 
(Baldwin et al., 2012, pp. 2–3).  For instance, exchange and use of personal data could be subject to 
self-regulation (in privacy policies), legislation (as with the Data Protection Act 1998) or by code (as 
with data encryption to protect against unauthorised access to personal data). 
3.3 Who are the Players? 
In order to understand how personal data is used in the context of SNSs, it is necessary to identify 
the players or agents involved in gathering, distributing and processing that data.  Figure 1 shows 
how personal data and advertising data flows between the different agents. 
Users and their contacts (other users) are grouped together as the advertisers may not necessarily 
distinguish between them.  Users provide personal data to their SNS provider via an ISP (Internet 
Service Provider).  The ISP is included because as an agent it may be subject to regulation or to legal 
action by other agents.  The SNS provider may make personal data available to associates and 
affiliates or to advertisers, who may be affiliated organisations or third parties.  Previous studies 
have shown that affiliates can number in the hundreds or even thousands, depending on what 
definition of affiliate is used. An investigation of the top 50 internet services showed that some 
providers were part of groups with up to 2,300 subsidiaries (Gomez, Pinnick, & Soltani, 2009).   
Personal data is also relayed to other users as an activity log (‘X has just updated their profile’, or ‘X 
has just made friends with Y’), either directly or via groups that they have in common.   
The advertisers then push tailored advertisements to targeted users.  In doing so they may use 
tracking technologies to monitor internet behaviour and to build up profiles of individual users.  This 
can be used with a registration system or login to a service provided by the advertising company to 
create identifiable (i.e. not anonymised) personal data. 
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FIGURE 1  -  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT AGENTS IN AN SNS 
3.4 Lessig’s Model of Internet Regulation 
Reidenberg (1998) in his model of regulation identified the following characteristics of internet 
regulation:  
Lex Informatica has three sets of characteristics that are particularly valuable for 
establishing information policy and rule-making in an Information Society. First, 
technological rules do not rely on national borders. Second, Lex Informatica allows 
easy customization of rules with a variety of technical mechanisms. Finally, 
technological rules may also benefit from built-in self-enforcement and compliance-
monitoring capabilities. 
This led to the development of a new model of regulation that, while acknowledging the importance 
of statutory legislation based on Law, considers other modes of regulation namely:  Norms, Market 
and Code (Lessig, 2006) shown in Figure 2.   
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FIGURE 2  -  LESSIG'S MODALITIES OF INTERNET REGULATION  
Although Lessig’s model has become a major reference point of analysis of different regulatory 
modes, other technology commentators such as Schmidt and Cohen (2013, p. 66) have described 
alternatives based on: corporate, legal, societal and personal responses to privacy and security 
needs.  Each of Lessig’s regulatory modes is considered in turn before a new model is proposed. 
3.4.1 Law 
In the UK the Data Protection Act 1998 is the main focus for statutory regulation of access to 
personal data.  This in turn is based on the EU’s Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which at the 
time of writing was due to be superseded by the General Data Protection Regulation in 2018.  It is 
also dependent on: the Human Rights Act 1998, which enshrines the right to privacy (Figure 3); the 
Communications Act 2003, which regulates some aspects of data communications via the internet; 
and the Consumer Protection Act 1987, which establishes a self-regulating framework for the 
advertising industry and affects the digital advertising companies that operate in association with 
SNSs. 
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FIGURE 3  -  LEGISLATIVE REGULATION IN THE UK 
Lessig (2006) does not make the distinction between law and self-regulation.  Even when considering 
legislative frameworks such as the Data Protection Act or advertising and consumer law in the UK, it 
is difficult to avoid self-regulation as a major component of the regulatory landscape.  It also does 
not take account of the self-imposed commitments that SNS providers make in their privacy policies 
and terms and conditions of service.  It could be argued that privacy policies are a type of ‘code’ in 
that they reflect the architecture of a system, however they are also an agreement between user 
and provider, and may be partially covered by contract law. 
3.4.2 Norms 
Lessig (2006) describes situations where users contravene accepted behaviour standards and are 
ostracised online.  Users’ behaviour and expectations can serve as a powerful regulatory force.  This 
can be applied to SNS and specifically to regulation of access to personal data on SNSs.  An earlier 
survey of LIS professionals in the UK suggested that users should have some responsibility for their 
own online safety (Haynes & Robinson, 2015).  This is a theme that has also been picked up by the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO, 2015).  Reports in the press indicated that users’ 
expectations have a powerful effect on SNS providers.  Cases such as the Facebook beacon device 
led to a strong reaction from users that resulted in its withdrawal because of its intrusive nature 
(Story & Stone, 2007).  The feature automatically tracked purchases made online and effectively 
publicised this information.  Boyd (2010) also suggests that norms operate within groups of 
connected individuals and that certain types of personal information are not revealed beyond the 
group.  Wider social norms about abuse on social media have been covered prominently in the press 
and this suggests that there are implied standards of acceptable behaviour which when contravened 
elicit a strong response beyond that of the law (BBC News, 2013b). 
All this points to the idea that social norms are an important factor in regulating SNSs (Rodrigues, 
2010, p. 238).  The effects of individual behaviour may be governed by collectively-held views of 
acceptable behaviour, but is only noticed at a market level when large numbers of users respond to 
breaches of norms: 
Similarly, the power of individual reputation and online social norms can go a long 
way towards preventing the abuse of personal information among users of social-
networking sites. 
Rodrigues goes on to highlight the importance of regulating the market to counter the natural 
monopolies that networks tend to create.  He advocates lowering switching costs so that users are 
not penalised for transferring their accounts to alternative social networking sites.  This is one of the 
new provisions in the GDPR (European Council, 2016). 
3.4.3 Architecture or ‘Code’ 
The way in which systems are designed and the options presented to users are an expression of 
‘code’.  This is about the system’s architecture and the way in which it controls access to personal 
data.  At the first level is the amount of personal data gathered by SNSs.  This varies significantly – 
SNSs such as Facebook and LinkedIn offer the opportunity to share very detailed personal 
information whereas services such as Twitter work on the basis of a minimal profile (up to 160 
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characters long).  The second consideration is what is the minimum amount of personal data 
required for users to register with an SNS and, supplementary to this, whether real names or aliases 
are acceptable.  This has led to controversy where networks such as Google+ have tried to impose 
the ‘real names’ requirements on users or where Facebook initially refused to accept preferred 
names for transvestites or transitioning transsexuals (Boyd, 2012; Lee, 2014).  At the third level is the 
range of privacy options or settings offered by SNSs.   
Lessig (2006) deals with technical architecture as an instrument of regulation.  This is an approach 
that has been taken up by a number of regulatory authorities, initially in Canada and latterly in the 
UK and the EU as ‘privacy by design’ (Cavoukian, 2012; Information Commissioner’s Office, 2008; 
Rubinstein & Good, 2013).  Code also includes other technology based solutions for managing user 
identities online or for blocking ads and cookies so that online behaviour is not actively tracked by 
someone else.  
Lessig’s (2006) model of ‘Code’ can be extended to include the architecture of the networks and 
communications services as well as the electronic ecosystem within which they exist.  This means 
that technology-based privacy and identity protection software as well as anti-spyware software are 
part of regulation by code.  As well as the SNSs themselves, there are independent solutions that are 
available as add-ins to browsers, for instance, to supress cookies and to isolate Trojans and other 
software designed to capture sensitive data such as passwords and account details.  This wider view 
of code as a regulatory instrument is important when considering the different agents involved. 
3.4.4 Markets 
Leading regulatory experts have a lot to say about regulation of market, but little is said about the 
use of markets to regulate an industry (Baldwin et al., 2012).  Market effects are recognised, but the 
emphasis of regulatory bodies is to introduce rules that make the markets operate in a way that the 
regulators consider desirable.  
The growth of internet communities and interactions has allowed the effective development of 
market-driven regulation.  This can be seen in social pressure on providers to comply with market 
expectations.  For instance, changes in the Facebook privacy settings without full consultation with 
users led to an outcry and pressure to retract (BBC News, 2011).  This may be because of the implicit 
threat that legislators may respond with new regulations to address the concerns of their voters.  
Lessig’s (2006) treatment of the market can be seen as a manifestation of user norms or as a 
response to legislation.  If norms, then where a sufficient number of users feel strongly about a 
service and they respond, they operate as a market.   
4 Results 
The interview respondents provided information about their perceptions of regulation of access to 
personal data on SNSs.  The Lessig model was used as the framework for identifying regulatory 
activity.  This was done in semi-structured interviews (see Appendix A).  
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4.1 Regulatory Effectiveness 
4.1.1 Views about Data Protection Legislation 
There was a degree of support for the data protection principles in the Data Protection Act 1998 by 
respondents, because it sets a standard.  The application of the eight data protection principles is 
seen as a flexible and appropriate way of protecting personal data:  
Interestingly the […] key principles have proved relatively flexible and when 
combined with the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulation (PECR) have 
created an environment in the UK where people are very comfortable.  
Chris Combemale, DMA 
I think the principles are valid now. There is obviously a debate about ‘the internet 
has moved on and we didn’t have Facebook in 1998 so therefore we need to reform 
things’, but the principles of the DPA exist well and good now.  
Nick Stringer, IABUK 
By setting a standard for good handling of personal data, the DPA is seen as being effective.  It 
affects the behaviour of companies that use or collect personal data and helps them to make their 
privacy policies more transparent: 
They probably have quite an effective deterrent effect for any legitimate business. 
Toby Stevens, Enterprise Privacy Group 
I guess that because the kind of providers we are working with, who are tending to 
look at it [tScheme] as a mainstream business (BT, the Post Office or the banks), they 
tend to have a healthy respect for the Data Protection Act and the Information 
Commissioner’s Office and therefore go out of their way almost to do things in a way 
that they believe is correct. 
Richard Trevorah, tScheme 
A good test of its effectiveness is to compare the situation with regions where there is no equivalent 
of Europe’s data protection legislation: 
However what I always compare this to is the counter-factual, which is the US. So a 
system where you have a total absence of rules governing the private sector and 
there you can see the effect the EU rules are actually having an impact in practice 
insofar as there is a minimum non-negotiable level of protection available for 
individuals, and companies will respect that. 
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Orla Lynskey, LSE 
4.1.2 Self-Regulation 
There was general support for self-regulation, not only from the digital advertising industry but also 
from the professional bodies: 
…there is a lot of feeling that self-regulation and adverse publicity is stronger way of 
enforcing people’s privacy than over-regulation which can clearly affect 
competitiveness. 
Peter Harris, BCS 
The Direct Marketing Association thought that self-regulation of the advertising industry works well 
in comparison with self-regulation of the press, for instance: 
In marketing and advertising it works very well. The ASA has been particularly 
effective and when they announce their adjudication that people have over-stepped 
the mark, it tends to be quite well respected.  
Chris Combemale, DMA 
Self-regulation was also seen as a preferable alternative to statutory regulation.  For instance, a 
representative of the cryptographic industry has made the following case: 
This is a new industry and it will kill the industry if you get too heavy-handed, and we 
don’t quite know where the market is going. ‘Why don’t you work with us to come up 
with best practice processes and we, the industry, will self-regulate according to 
those standards. If you’re happy those standards are appropriate, it should be good 
enough’. That was basically the initial remit of tScheme as an industry body to police 
the self-regulation.  
Richard Trevorah, tScheme 
Toby Stevens of the Enterprise Privacy Group suggested that self-regulation needs to be very 
focused, with clearly-defined regulatory mechanisms to be effective.  He went on to suggest that a 
bond paid by members of the industry would act as a way of rapidly responding to complaints and 
penalising offending companies: 
Self-regulation is only going to work where it is sector specific. It only means 
anything if all the significant players in one space say ‘Yeah, we’ll sign up to this’ […] 
I’ve not seen any evidence of a self-regulation mechanism that has teeth.  An 
effective self-regulation mechanism would be identity assurance. For example, you 
have to deposit funds, a bond, like the travel industry, so that when there is a failure, 
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the regulator can dip into that deposit to fix things. […] Without that sort of 
mechanism I don’t think self-regulation can be meaningful.  
The social network providers also regulate the way in which brands use personal data they have 
downloaded via APIs by applying contract law: 
Each of the brands that we engage with has to have a contractual arrangement with 
those network service providers. It’s basically the social networks protecting (in their 
language) their users’ data. […] For example, Facebook will happily let you have 
access to the data on the customers that they have in the social network because 
they have published a bunch more [profiles] than anyone else. You get 52 different 
elements of information on an individual from postings. But if you’re going to use 
that information for advertising, they throw a flag on the play and they won’t let you 
do it. 
Russell Loarridge, Janrain 
A key aspect of self-regulation is the application of privacy policies and terms of service provided by 
the SNSs for their users.  Having a policy that makes clear to users their rights and obligations is 
important.  Ultimately they are enforced by contract law, although there may be some dispute about 
which jurisdiction holds sway. 
Some have also started responding to the need for greater transparency so that users can make 
informed decisions about how their personal data is used: 
I also think we need to look at how social media systems work, especially how they 
change their terms and conditions. They can change these quite significantly and 
quite often. This can be very confusing for people.  They could do more to give people 
clearer choices at the appropriate times and better control mechanisms thorough 
nice clear simple yes-no choices. I think people sometimes feel overwhelmed and that 
they don’t really control who sees their information and what happens to it.  
Information-based firms need to do more to calm that anxiety, through being 
transparent, offering choices and using information in line with their users’ 
expectations. 
Iain Bourne, ICO 
You have the fundamental starting point, data protection law is based on consent. I 
would argue that would also mean informed and meaningful consent and that you 
don’t get informed and meaningful consent from asking someone to sign a privacy 
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policy that is longer than the theory of relativity, that was written by lawyers for 
lawyers. 
Nick Pickles, Bigbrotherwatch 
Many SNS providers are US-based and have relied on the EU-US Safe Harbor self-regulatory 
arrangements to demonstrate compliance with the Data Protection Directive.  The Safe Harbor 
arrangement was ruled invalid by the European Court of Justice in 2015, although service providers 
still have access to other methods (such as contracts and robust procedures) to demonstrate 
compliance with the legislation in Europe (Haynes, 2015a).  The introduction of the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield in 2016 to some extent replaces the Safe Harbor arrangements (European Commission, 2016). 
4.1.3 Technology and Design 
Technology plays an increasingly important role in regulating access to personal data on social 
media.  Cookie blocking software can be used as apps or add-ins on many browsers to identify and 
highlight cookies and allow users to block them selectively or comprehensively.  The Ghostery 
software is one example of this.  The European Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA) also 
offers a utility via the www.youronlinechoices.eu website to block cookies.  
Ad blocking software can also be installed to prevent pop-up ads from appearing on websites.  This 
type of software is increasingly being adopted by users, a point that was noted: 
Social media users and others are slowly but surely getting more assertive and more 
critical in terms of how people use their information and that they do find some 
forms of advertising intrusive. A good example is ‘beacon marketing’, where your 
social media ‘friends’ are informed automatically of goods you’ve purchased on an e-
commerce site. The fact that so many people are using ad blocking services is a bit of 
a worry I’d have thought, if my business model relied on advertising. 
Iain Bourne, ICO 
Software designed for computer security and dealing with malware also includes anti-tracking 
technologies that delete or suppress cookies as one of a number of security features.  There are also 
services such as Mydex and Janrain, which provide ways of sharing personal data in a more 
controlled manner, so that the user has a choice about who sees what.  Trust frameworks such as 
tScheme can be applied to such services to indicate to users that data-sharing is compliant with a 
stated policy. 
Privacy by design is one of the elements of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) to improve 
privacy protection. 
A lot of the greatest advances that have been made in privacy by design and privacy 
enhancement have been by the big tech firms. They don’t want all that personal data 
sloshing around; it’s expensive; it’s a liability. I think it is important to realise that 
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they are not the ‘baddies’ in that sense, they are maybe developing the cures for 
some of these problems. 
Iain Bourne, ICO 
This is an approach that is supported by the industry: 
The nice route with identity assurance is using federation and privacy by design 
principles. That type of approach is able to compartmentalise; it will allow you to 
minimise the data leakage between these domains, so that you can anonymously 
assert information. It moves us into an attribute rather than an identity economy.  I 
think the solution is actually assurance rather than identity. 
Toby Stevens, Enterprise Privacy Group 
4.1.4 User Behaviour 
Market responses and individual behaviour are both manifestations of individual attitudes about 
what is acceptable.  In effect users regulate online advertising either by the decisions they take as 
individuals (for instance to determine how much personal data they will share on social media), or 
by the cumulative effect of their collective behaviour (using alternative services if they do not like 
what’s going on). 
The issue of user awareness has arisen in previous surveys and this is seen as one of the most 
effective ways of protecting users.  As Guy Daines of CILIP (the Chartered Institute of Library and 
Information Professionals) said: 
What we are really talking about here is information behaviour, in how people use 
information in their work and also in their personal life. It is about instilling the idea 
about responsible use. […] It’s about changing the culture about being careful about 
privacy.  
It is also about personal responsibility: 
The consumers who register on these sites don’t read the small print about what 
they are allowing the brands to do with their data.  
Russell Loarridge, Janrain 
From the early days of SNSs commentators were calling for greater investment in user education, 
specifically in response to the use of advertising beacon technology (Gray, Zeggane, & Maxwell, 
2008).  The collective behaviour of users can become regulation by the market, or ‘mode’ in Lessig’s 
categorisation of regulatory modalities.  For instance, if a significant proportion of users start to 
leave a service, the service may respond in a way that addresses user dissatisfaction.  As one 
respondent put it: 
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the only reign-in on those organisations is the damage to their brand if they did 
something stupid 
Russell Loarridge, Janrain 
Research by the Future of Privacy Forum in the United States “to assess the communication efficacy 
of behavioral advertising disclosures on the web” found that disclosure statements and icons 
increase the comfort of active internet users when confronted with ads on third-party websites 
(Hastak & Culnan, 2010). 
Others maintain that user behaviour is probably the best regulator: 
It has got to a point where to what extent do they [SNSs] have to start deliberately 
showing me wrong adverts, because if they were right all the time, consumers would 
go ‘Hang on a minute, they do know everything about me’.  It’s the ‘creepy line’ 
(phrase used by Google and the NY Times). That creepy line is probably the better 
regulator than either self-regulation or legal regulation.  
Nick Pickles, Bigbrotherwatch 
Iain Bourne of the ICO argued that regulation probably works because of the concern of SNS 
providers about loss of market: 
If you look at the way that groups of social media users grouped together to 
campaign against changes to privacy policies, changes to practices, it’s really 
interesting.  There is evidence that some of the social networking sites [are] changing 
the way they do advertising, because of pressure from their own users…You see this 
more in the US I’d say but I think it will happen more in the EU as well. Maybe user 
power is having more influence than regulation in some areas.  
Iain Bourne, ICO 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 A Revised Model of Regulation of Personal Data on SNSs 
Lessig (2006) has shaped the nature of the debate about regulation of the internet, firstly by 
conceptualising the idea that the architecture of systems (Code) is one way of regulating, and by 
identifying four modes of regulation.  Since his initial work in the early days of the Internet and again 
in the early years of this century at the point when social media started to take off, many new 
services have been launched and mobile apps have become pervasive.  His model is largely 
applicable to online social networking services and provided a useful starting point for an 
investigation of the nature of regulation of access to personal data on online SNSs (Haynes, 2015b).  
Revisiting the model through an investigation of the literature, surveys of data protection 
professionals and interviews with key informants has shown that self-regulation has become a very 
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important strand of the regulatory landscape.  Lessig makes very little reference to self-regulation in 
his book, Code 2.0 and when he does it is applied to users regulating their behaviour online (an 
aspect of norms) and to self-governance of the internet (Lessig, 2006, pp. 97, 394).  This first 
interpretation is supported by Cooke (2004, p. 36) who suggests that self-regulation is a form of 
‘norm-based governance’. 
Earlier commentators on regulation have identified self-regulation as a significant method of 
regulation, even while pointing out its limitations (Cannataci & Bonnici, 2003; Spinello, 2002).  Park 
(2014) provides a more detailed analysis of self-regulation based on a review of 398 commercial 
websites in the United States.  Although he sees it as insufficient for ensuring data protection on its 
own, he recognises it as a significant form of regulation.  Self-regulation by an industry can apply if 
there are suitable sanctions for non-compliance such as expulsion from a group with consequent 
loss of credibility and market share.  Park’s argument is that there is no evidence that companies 
which publish privacy policies (an expression of self-regulation) are any better at protecting privacy 
than those that do not. 
Surrogate regulation or co-regulation, where the responsibility for regulating a professional group or 
industry is vested in a professional or trade body, can also be effective (Hans-Bredow Institut, 2006).  
Membership of the body becomes a condition of being allowed to trade.  This can be seen with the 
established professions and some sectors in the UK (such as civil engineers, lawyers, doctors and 
architects).  This approach takes the burden of regulation away from the state and the costs of 
regulation are borne by the regulated individuals or industry. 
In this study representatives industry bodies such as the Direct Marketing Association as well as the 
regulator, the ICO, and the campaign group, Bigbrotherwatch recognised self-regulation as a 
regulatory method, although they differed on how effective it was as a way of protecting users’ 
personal data on SNSs. 
Lessig acknowledges the interdependence of different regulatory modes.  For instance, markets 
regulate largely by availability and price and this in turn is affected by social norms and by the 
legislative environment.  As such regulation by the market, as Lessig describes it, is an expression of 
the activity of suppliers.  If pricing is the main mechanism by which markets operate, the model 
breaks down for SNSs where the monetary value and cost to consumers of services is difficult to 
determine.  The social media services tend to be free at the point of delivery and the costs are 
carried by advertisers.  This causes a divorce between the interests of users and the drivers for the 
market.  If the services are indirectly paid for by the industry, the market response will be 
determined ultimately by industry rather than users.  An alternative model is required to reflect the 
wider interests of users.  The proposed new model, acknowledges the importance of the market as a 
regulator but sees it as an expression of social norms.  ‘Norms’ covers both individual behaviour and 
attitudes and collective behaviour as seen in the market responses to services.  The behaviour of 
suppliers is covered in both self-regulation and code – the way in which services are delivered.  
Indeed Mitchell (1996, pp. 111, 147) talks about code and norms, but does not include markets in his 
commentary on regulation of cyberspace. 
Another problem with the concept of regulation by the market, is that the market is the object of 
regulation, not the method.   
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Regulation by the state is the starting point for an analysis of regulation (Baldwin et al., 2012).  A 
preliminary survey of users and data protection officers suggested that there is some scepticism 
about the effectiveness of the Data Protection Act as a means of regulating access to personal data 
on social networks (Haynes, 2011).  This was borne out by interviews with regulators and industry 
experts reported here.  Although some respondents found it to be effective, many considered that 
the legislation alone was insufficient.  Several respondents saw other modes such as self-regulation, 
user education, and technology as important elements in the protection of personal data.  
Nevertheless legislation is a key element in any model of regulation of SNSs. 
Figure 4 shows the proposed model of regulation of access to personal data on SNSs, compring four 
modes of regulation: 
1. Legislation 
2. Self-regulation 
3. Code 
4. Norms 
This proposed model of regulation builds on Lessig’s (2006) idea that there are four modalities for 
regulating the Internet.  It attempts to cover a major omission in the lack of a category for self-
regulation.  The model also makes a stronger connection between ‘Norms’ and collective user 
behaviour which Lessig treats separately as ‘Markets’.  This new model also recognises that 
legislation affects self-regulation which is usually manifest in privacy policies and in industry codes of 
practice.  These codes of practice may themselves by governed by legislation or they may be 
industry-driven.  The way in which enterprises design and deliver SNSs (Code) is itself a form of self-
regulation. 
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FIGURE 4  -  REGULATING ACCESS TO PERSONAL DATA -  NEW MODEL  
5.2 Significance 
This research set out to explore the relationship between different modes of regulation of access to 
personal data and to develop a model that reflects the current regulatory landscape.  It highlighted 
the importance of self-regulation.  In the context of ‘light-touch’ government this is a theme that 
very topical.  A realistic model of regulation is required in order to be able to evaluate regulatory 
effectiveness.  The absence of self-regulation in Lessig’s original model of Internet regulation was a 
major omission. 
The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has also highlighted regulatory 
issues with the emphasis on individual firms to police their own activity.  This is particularly the case 
with the self-reporting of data breaches, although likely to be backed up with stiff penalties for 
organisations that do not follow the regulation.  A number of commentators have highlighted risk 
based regulation as characteristic of the European regulatory landscape (Haythornthwaite, 2006; 
Hutter, 2005; Swedlow, Kall, Zhou, Hammitt, & Wiener, 2009).  This is something that seems to be 
borne out from the wording of the GDPR which refers throughout to “risk to the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons” (European Council, 2016).  A regulatory model based on risk analysis will help to 
provide an informed view about the effectiveness of the GDPR when it is implemented across the 
European Union in 2018. 
Information governance is another important theme that has developed over recent years.  Many 
organisations, increasingly aware of the threats that there are to their information assets, are 
developing comprehensive information governance frameworks.  These include measures for 
information security and risk management and depend on clear lines of responsibility and 
accountability.  The widespread use of social media in the workplace has introduced new risks, 
which need to be managed.  An understanding of regulation will help to inform the debate about 
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information governance and raise awareness of the approaches that are available to information 
managers. 
5.3 Further work 
The proposed regulatory model described here is based on an analysis of regulation of access to 
personal data rather than the wider ‘internet regulation’ model proposed by Lessig.  The model is in 
effect a hypothesis built up by considering personal risks associated with use of online social 
networking services and considering the regulatory mechanisms available.   
Research of this type has limitations and there is scope for further development and refinement of 
this regulatory model.  During this investigation it was not possible to secure interviews with 
representatives of the SNS providers.  The digital advertising bodies were used as surrogates for the 
SNS providers and further work is needed to obtain the views of SNS providers directly.  Future 
research could focus on the views of SNS providers about the proposed model of regulation and to 
find out whether it reflects their perception of the regulatory pressures that they experience. 
The next step is to validate the model by consulting different groups of stakeholders: users, SNS 
providers, regulators, advertisers.  In order to validate the hypothesis using a ‘grounded theory’ 
approach, it would be important not to consult the same people that were consulted during the 
hypothesis construction (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  This presents a potential problem 
in the case of the regulators, as there is only one data protection regulator in the UK.  As a 
representative of the ICO was interviewed during the development of this model, it would be 
necessary either to interview a different person from the ICO, or to consult an official from the 
European Data Protection Supervisor’s office instead. 
The model has been developed to reflect the regulatory landscape that applies to SNSs used in the 
UK and to some extent in Europe.  However it could be tested for applicability in other markets such 
as the United States, where there is a very different regulatory framework.  Recent developments in 
China, Russia and Brazil to protect citizens’ personal data (especially against transfer overseas) 
suggests a growing perception that a legislative approach to information privacy is required (Chen & 
Sun, 2014; Determann, Bekeschenko, Perevalov, & Wood, 2015; Medeiros & Bygrave, 2015).  To 
some extent this may be a response to Snowden’s NSA revelations, and it would be worth exploring 
this further (Greenwald, 2013; Haynes, 2015a).  
An alternative line of investigation would be to consider risks from a corporate perspective.  For 
instance, what are the risks faced by organisations that use social media for promotional and 
campaigning activities?  Under the Defamation Act 2013 website hosts are responsible for 
anonymously-posted defamatory statements and this changes the regulatory landscape.  Some 
examples of corporate risks associated with social media are already under investigation elsewhere 
(Haynes, 2016). 
Finally, this research plugs into a wider consideration of regulation on the internet.  Further work 
could be undertaking to consider copyright, intellectual property and censorship issues in addition to 
the privacy issues covered here.   
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Appendix A – Interview Questions 
The following individuals were interviewed in the period March-April 2014: 
Organisation  Contact name Date Type of interview 
Bigbrotherwatch Nick Pickles, Director 17 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
British Computer Society Peter Harris, Chair, Information 
Privacy Expert Panel 
3 Mar 2014 Telephone 
CILIP Guy Daines, Head of Policy 6 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
Direct Marketing Association Chris Combemale, CEO 3 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Enterprise Privacy Group Toby Stevens 1 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
Information Commissioner’s 
Office 
Ian Bourne 19 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
Internet Advertising Bureau, UK Nick Stringer, Director, 
Regulatory Affairs 
11 Mar 2014 Face-to-face 
Janrain Russell Loarridge 8 Apr 2014 Telephone 
London School of Economics Orla Lynsky, Assistant 
Professor of Law 
9 Apr 2014 Face-to-face 
tScheme Richard Trevorah 7 Apr 2014 Telephone 
 
Introduction (for participants) 
The purpose of this interview is to find out the views of respondents on the different ways in which 
access to personal data on social media is regulated in the UK.  The study is part of a PhD research 
project exploring the relationship between personal risk and regulation of online social networking 
services and follows on from an online survey on risk perceptions among users. 
This interview will consist of a series open questions covering: 
 Current measures in place for protecting personal data on online social networking services 
 Your views on the effectiveness of current measures 
 Specific issues and problems associated with personal data 
 Potential future measures, including proposed legislation 
The interview is expected to last between 45 minutes and one hour in total.  It will be recorded 
(audio recording) so that the notes can be accurately transcribed and analysed.  We may need to 
contact you subsequently for clarification of any points arising from the interview.  We will only do 
this with your permission. 
This study is subject to the approval of the City University London, School of Informatics Research 
Ethics Committee.  It is one of the University’s requirements that all survey respondents should have 
consented to participation in the study before participating.  [Make sure that the respondent has 
had a chance to read the participant guidelines and has signed the consent form before beginning 
the interview.] 
Questions 
Preliminaries 
Interview with [Name] of [Organisation] on [Date] 
Background about your regulatory role 
Can you please explain your organisation’s role in regulating access to personal data? 
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[Prompts] 
 Code of practice – Training – Awareness 
 Promotion of good practice 
 Target audiences 
 Written guidelines 
 Current or due for update? 
Views on risk 
What do you think are the main risks that users are exposed to when they use online social 
networking services? [Prompt with a list of risks identified in previous surveys, if necessary] 
Do you think that regulation reduces risks to individual users of social networks?  In what ways? 
Regulatory measures in place 
What other measures that you are aware of are in place to protect social media users against misuse 
of their personal data? 
[Service providers and advertisers] What measures does your organisation/industry take (have in 
place) to protect users against misuse of their data?  
[SNS Providers and Advertisers] Do you subscribe to an industry code of practice? 
 Who issues the code of practice?  Do you have a contact? 
 Do you have a copy of the code of practice that I can have? 
Views on legislation 
What is your view of the current Data Protection Act as a way of protecting people against misuse of 
personal data that they put up on online Social networking services? 
 Do you think that the current legislation is effective? 
 Do you think that it could be improved?  If so, in what ways? 
In your view, is this area over- or under-regulated? Why? 
Are you familiar with the proposed European Data Protection Regulation currently under discussion? 
 Do you think this is an improvement on the current legislation?  Why? 
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Regulatory effectiveness 
[Regulators and self-regulators] How do you assess regulatory effectiveness?  
[Regulators and self-regulators] Do you think that risk could be used as a way of measuring 
regulatory effectiveness? 
Responsibility for regulation 
Who should have primary responsibility for protecting users against misuse of personal data that 
they put up on SNS profiles?  [Prompt: users themselves, industry bodies, system designers, SNS 
providers, the government, others?]  
Why? 
Follow-up 
May we quote you? 
May we attribute any interview comments to you? 
May we identify your organisation? 
May we approach you again if any points need clarifying or if we need to follow up any aspect of this 
interview? 
Can you suggest other people or organisations that you think should be consulted as part of this 
study? – Can I mention your name? 
Thank you  
 
